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ABSTRACT 
 
Engaging in a just energy transition implies the equitable participation of all stakeholders. The successful 
development of renewable energy infrastructure projects relies on a strong social support. Companies must 
implement ambitious community engagement practices to gain a social license to operate (SLO) and, thus, 
mitigate social acceptance risks. 
This study aims at investigating the interactions between involved companies and host communities of such 
projects in South Africa, where firms must engage in local economic development activities. It focuses on the 
construction phase of third-party EPC projects (when Engineering, Procurement and Construction services are 
offered by an actor that is not the original developer). 
Based on a comprehensive literature review, field research was conducted. Thorough observations were 
recorded. Questionnaire surveys were disseminated to the company’s employees and local workers. Semi-
structured interviews and discussions were conducted with company’s representatives, local workers, and other 
community members. A comparative case study approach is adopted to evaluate corporate management 
strategies. Two projects located in the North West province, Bokamoso and Waterloo Solar Parks, and overseen 
by the same EPC company, are analyzed. The SLO concept is utilized to assess actual community responses and 
frame elements of corporate management that might have influenced the positive observed levels of SLO. 
Results show that: 
• There is a slight mismatch between the reality on site and its perception by the company.  
• The company maintains a negative approach to communication, both internally and externally, which 
negatively influenced local communities’ responses. 
• Community responses are also shaped by external factors that the company acknowledges but difficultly 
navigates. 
These results suggest that host communities and local rules of the game should be better understood by 
corporate proponents. Practical recommendations to improve community engagement and better mitigate 
social acceptance risks in renewable energy infrastructure projects, solely during the construction phase, in South 
Africa are offered.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 / Towards a socially just energy transition 
 
Energy transition has become an absolute urgency. The scarcity and the environmental impact of 
conventional fossil fuels associated with the anticipated demographic growth drives the necessary diversification 
of the energy mix including more and more low-carbon power generation and an increase in energy production. 
Indeed, not only will the point be to deal with climate change, but the issue will also be to improve energy access 
globally (Zinecker et al., 2018). 
Energy transition is a long-term transformation of, in the current era, a fossil fuel-based energy system 
to one mainly based on renewable energy (RE). It aims at changing the whole energy chain – from its production 
to its extraction, conversion, transport, delivery and to its final use (Baker et al., 2014; Sokona et al., 2012). 
Because it is such a comprehensive process, it must be built on a strong set of policies and practical regulations 
(Lucas and Thompson, 2018). 
On a global scale, representatives of countries meet regularly to discuss international goals to reach in 
the following decades regarding climate change mitigation and RE development. With the publication of the MIT 
report The Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972), and the UN Stockholm conference of 1972, states promised to 
meet every ten years for the Earth Summits. In 1995, with the Rio Conference, the annual conference of the 
Parties (COP) was created. These international organizations, as well as bilateral meetings, then, put pressure on 
countries and states to make them adopt the final guidelines into their own legal frameworks, in the same way 
the Paris agreement of 2015 required parties to sign and ratify the text. 
 
Beyond this necessary legal application of the principles of energy transition, more and more attention 
is put on the social component of energy. Indeed, if the energy transition requires a solid institutional support 
and a favorable regulatory framework, in addition to technical innovation, it also requires a strong social support 
and impact (Zinecker et al., 2018). It must be actively accepted and fostered by people who are to work in these 
new industries (and maybe leave their job in other fossil fuels industries) or simply to live with new infrastructure, 
technology, or ways of consuming energy. 
In practice on the power production side, in the context of renewable energy infrastructure (REI), 
companies involved in such projects need the approval of local stakeholders that are or could be affected. 
However, this approach to REI has only recently started to be considered. Indeed, the social impact of renewables 
was often overlooked and neglected, in favor of their positive environmental impact and their key role in the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  
 The concept of “just” energy transition has, thus, slowly been appropriated. Its definition is not fixed. 
Nevertheless, its basic principles make particular sense for the REI industry. Overall, it implies a process enabled 
by dialogue between all the stakeholders and that ensures the minimization of negative externalities and an 
equitable sharing of the value (Zinecker et al., 2018). It represents a priority in a world fueled by injustice and 
inequality, the risk of not engaging in such a just transition being to foster an energy transition that still favors 
the privileged. A just energy transition constitutes an opportunity to move away from the current inequal state 
of the world (Lavelle, 2015). 
 
1.2 / Considering community responses in REI projects 
 
Research on the social aspects of energy infrastructure, an object that seems, at first, solely technical, 
has been developing for the past twenty years. Indeed, the planning model has switched from a mere expert-
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based process with little to no communication with host communities to a process including greater interactive 
mechanisms (Filion, 1999). This ongoing change occurred to ease project development, while facilitating the 
longevity of projects. It is about understanding the needs and wants of people who receive an infrastructure in 
their community and fostering citizen engagement in planning where possible to avoid project delays or even 
the potential termination of the project (Search et al., 2017; Gonzalez et al., 2016). 
 
In the literature, these considerations have mainly been approached through the concept of “social 
acceptance”. Although there is no definite and commonly accepted definition of this term, “social acceptance” 
in the energy industry can be understood as a positive reaction towards a project by the members of a given 
society.  
A first attempt at analyzing this notion defines its three dimensions: socio-political acceptance (which 
refers to the general level of social acceptance), market acceptance (referring to the adoption of RE technologies 
by market actors) and community acceptance (local stakeholders) (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). Yet, beyond 
acceptance, the literature also includes widespread cases of social resistance to energy infrastructure across the 
globe (see Mondal et al., 2010; Brower Brown, 2011; Cashmore et al., 2019). 
 
In line with the evidence of opposition, the concept of “social acceptance” and its reception in academia 
are widely questioned and debated. Most articles focus only on one dimension, while they should be considered 
as inter-related (Devine-Wright et al., 2017). Also, the terminology is at the center of discussions. The term 
“acceptance” seems to perpetuate a top-down perspective and involves the risk of ignoring a variety of other 
responses (Batel et al., 2013). Nevertheless, Wolsink (2018) emphasizes that the term “acceptance” is relevant 
in the sense that energy transition implies the necessity that crucial actors accept the transformation and that 
the term was, from the start, meant to include a wide range of dynamic positions. Yet, for this research project, 
and as recommended in Batel and colleagues (2013), the concept of “publics’ responses” will be preferred as it 
appears to be more accurate.  
 
Another concern in the literature of “social acceptance” is the focus on the early stages of energy 
infrastructure development. However, social acceptance or response must be considered as a dynamic process. 
An individual’s attitudes, behaviors or intentions may evolve throughout the project (Oltra et al., 2014). 
 Finally, there is a dearth of knowledge on social acceptance in developing countries. Most of the 
literature on the concept focuses on Western countries. There are a few studies on factors influencing socio-
political or community acceptance in developing and emerging countries such as Brazil for wind power (Muylaert 
de Araujo and Vasconcelos de Freitas, 2008), Mexico (Mallett, 2007) or Algeria for shale gas projects (Zerguini, 
2016). In the specific case of South Africa, there have been only two studies related to the concept of social 
acceptance of RE (Lombard and Ferreira, 2014; Modikela Nkoana, 2018). In the former, the authors explored 
place attachment in the context of proposed wind farm projects in the Western Cape province. In the latter piece 
of research, however, the researcher investigated the deficient application of corporate promises to 
communities in the context of two operating solar farms in the Limpopo province. Therefore, there is the need 
to consider the ongoing response of communities living with an existent REI as well as understanding the involved 
companies stands, positions and attitudes towards it. 
 
 In a nutshell, research is lacking on public response to infrastructure in developing countries (particularly 
in Africa). Furthermore, the interactions between communities, existent REI projects (as opposed to proposed 
projects) and corporate proponents is often overlooked. In the same way, the evolution of responses to REI from 
ideation to operation, the full life cycle of projects and the potential social adaptation have not received enough 
attention in academia. 
  
Anissa Sidhoum Hassaïne - 9 
 
1.3 / The ambition of the present research project 
 
Thus, the present research project followed a twofold ambition. First, it aimed at identifying how host 
communities of REI projects react and live with the infrastructure. It was about assessing and understanding the 
community responses. Then, it aimed at investigating how involved companies shaped these responses through 
their actions and considerations and mitigated social risks. Essentially, it aimed at exploring the complex 
relationship between these two groups of actors.  
To that end, a case study approach was utilized. Two PV (photovoltaic) solar projects, Bokamoso at 
Leeudoringstad and Waterloo at Vryburg, located in the North West province in South Africa were analyzed. If 
they both presented similar technical characteristics, they generated different outcomes in terms of community 
responses, one being particularly prone to disruptions. Yet, even with apparent challenges, the involved 
companies achieved to deliver the projects.   
The particularities of the chosen study cases narrowed the scope of the study to the following elements. 
Both projects were in their construction phase, defined as the period from the end of development to 
commissioning (see Appendix A). The development and exploitation phases are, thus, voluntarily left out of this 
paper. If their study would have been particularly informative, it would have required more extensive research 
means in terms of time and funding. The selected projects also both were third-party EPC (Engineering, 
Procurement, Construction) projects, meaning that a company different from the initial project developer was 
appointed to oversee EPC activities. Projects undertaken by a project developer that is also a constructor or 
operators do not concern this study.  
The main research question that this paper aimed to answer is: How and to what extent do companies 
involved in the construction of REI projects shape host community responses and, thus, the social acceptance 
risk? Involved companies in this construction phase are the EPC company, and subsequently, its subcontractors.  
 
Social acceptance risk entered the top 10 business risks defined by Ernst & Young in 2010 (EY, 2010). 
Indeed, it is now understood that the lack of local stakeholders’ support or an active opposition to business 
activities can profoundly impede operations, and, thus, constitute a risk that is to be anticipated and mitigated. 
Overall, the results of this research project could be valuable to further assist in the development of energy 
transition in South Africa and other emerging economies through the implementation of successful REI projects 
and by improving their social impact. In the corporate and legal setting, the research offers practical information 
to improve corporate social responsibility (CSR) / local economic development strategies and policies and, 
ultimately, better manage social risks. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This research project drew on the theory of social license to operate (SLO). This refers to an informal 
license granted by local stakeholders and earned and maintained by companies regarding the ongoing corporate 
operations. It is, essentially, a continuous social permission to conduct and operate a project. It provides 
companies with tools to assess and organize a social dialogue (Moffat et al., 2016). 
The concept first emerged in the mining and extractive industries as a means of assuring the longevity of 
socially questioned projects. It was first used by James Cooney, an officer of Placer Dome in a World Bank meeting 
in 1997 (Boutilier, 2014). And, it slowly integrated other industries, such as, since a fairly recent period and not 
to a wide extent, the RE sector (see Corscadden et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2012; Hall, 2014; Hall and Jeanneret, 
2015). 
 
The SLO is deeply rooted in other concepts surrounding the CSR debates. It is closely linked to 
sustainability as it implies an ongoing relationship between proponent companies and community actors. It also 
is the result of a switch from the concept of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). This notion was developed 
by the United Nations especially for industries operating in areas with indigenous people. SLO broadens the 
approach of FPIC (Wilburn, 2011).  
Additionally, it is important to highlight the difference between CSR and SLO. CSR is a wide framework 
that can be considered too peripheral to the core model of business (Morrison, 2014). Indeed, the CSR theory 
starts with the economic responsibility of the business to make profit and then ends with its philanthropic 
responsibility (Brusseau, 2012). On the contrary, the SLO aims at introducing social considerations directly into 
core business models. 
 
The SLO was first conceptualized in Joyce and Thomson (2000). They recognized the necessity of 
legitimacy in gaining the SLO and added two other requirements: credibility and trust. They formulated a 
hierarchy of perceptions with two different levels: acceptance and approval. 
Their analysis was, then, improved by Thomson and Boutilier (2011). They created a cumulative hierarchy 
model with four levels and three boundaries. In their model, the first level of SLO, acceptance, is achieved with 
legitimacy. Without legitimacy, the SLO faces rejection / withdrawal. Then, approval is achieved with credibility. 
Finally, “psychological identification” is achieved with trust. This highest level of SLO describes a very stable 
environment and is only rarely achieved (Boutilier et al., 2012).  
In this model, the SLO must be understood as a dynamic and project- or site-specific concept. It can 
fluctuate over time and it depends solely on the characteristics of the project and the community. Also, this 
“community” must be considered as a network of stakeholders. Indeed, the “community” is often a 
heterogeneous entity. It is, then, the duty of the company to invest in social capital to build a uniform entity 
through “community building” strategies (Thomson and Boutilier, 2011). 
Furthermore, ideally, companies should start with “the assumption that they do not currently hold a 
social licence, and that they must engage in ongoing, dialogic negotiation of community and societal expectations 
and perceptions” (Parsons and Moffat, 2014, p.357). 
Figure 1 summarizes the cumulative hierarchy model with its levels, boundaries and some indicators 
identified by the Sustainable Business Council of New Zealand (2014).  
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Figure 1. The SLO scale 
 
 
The concept has widely been used and reviewed in the academic literature. Each scholar highlights the 
factor that makes more sense in their studies. Stakeholders need to join an early dialogue about the planning of 
a project (Wolsink 2007; Parsons and Moffat 2014). They also need to be informed and educated regarding the 
actual impacts of the project (Banks et al., 2010). And, trust seems to be the main indicator of community 
acceptance in Moffat and Zhang (2014). However, their model actually highlights the centrality of trust to get 
acceptance and approval and differs from Thomson and Boutilier’s model then.  
If Gehman, Lefsrud, and Fast (2017) highlight the existence of three varieties of SLO (the pyramid, three-
strand and triangle model), they all seem to be relying on Thomson, Boutilier’s pyramidal model and definition. 
Indeed, in the three-strand model, social license shares the stage with a political and legal license. And, the 
triangle model relying on the concept of “social acceptance” as defined in Wüstenhagen and colleagues (2007) 
can be understood as only one part of the SLO. 
 
 If the concept of the SLO has mainly been used in the mining sector, it is a relevant theoretical framework 
for the RE industry because the latter faces similar social challenges and risks that it needs to confront. In South 
Africa, the SLO is even more relevant as companies must thrive in a very complex social context and a specific 
corporate culture imposed by the government. It even seems like the government of South Africa is attempting 
to formalize the SLO into its regulations (Matebesi and Marais, 2018). 
 
 In this research project, the SLO theory was used to analyze the ongoing relationship between the host 
community and the involved companies, regarding the studied REI projects. From the literature, a successful 
project appears to be one that is fully accepted by host communities, adopted as being part of their environment 
and that eventually unfolds without significant delay related to social resistance. Thus, this research project lies 
on the assumption that the main key factor to achieve such a success is the obtention and maintenance of the 
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SLO. By investigating the corporate considerations, strategies, and actions, the SLO is used to assess the way the 
EPC company acts towards the development of responses from the host communities it should work with. 
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3. CASE STUDY INFORMATION 
 
3.1 / Renewable energy infrastructure projects in South Africa 
 
In Africa, South Africa seems to be leading the path towards energy transition and the development of 
renewables. Even though the country is still greatly reliant on coal and other fossil fuels, South Africa is embracing 
RE (Simelane and Abdel-Rahman, 2011). The combination of the stringent international drive, national energy 
security concerns, recurrent load shedding episodes imposed by Eskom, the national electricity company, and 
the increased profitability of wind and solar power make RE more attractive to participate in both the economic 
growth and the development of the country.  
Indeed, it is firmly believed by the South African government that renewables can be an opportunity for 
the development of the South African population (National Planning Commission, 2012). For that reason, all 
regulations and laws related to RE production by the private sector in the country include a strong social 
component, by adopting a sustainability approach to the concept of energy transition.  
 
South Africa already has a specific corporate culture that favors social inclusion (Wlokas et al., 2017). The 
“preferential procurement policy framework act 05 of 2000” obliged the government to allocate “points” to 
companies owned by people “historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender or 
disability”. Therefore, the focus is on favoring the black population with the “broad-based black economic 
empowerment act 53 of 2003” (BBBEE) which was then translated with a “code of good practice”1. The 2015 
version includes guidelines on ownership, management, skills development, and the broad socio-economic 
development. 
On top of these acts, in 2011, the RE industry was introduced with the Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producers Procurement Program (REIPPPP). This special procurement program enables private 
investment in large and small energy generation across South Africa. It combines previous goals explicated in the 
Integrated Resource Plan 2010-2030 (IRP 2010) and the National Development Plan (2030). The first one 
indicated the necessity of an additional 17 800MW of power from RE by 2030. The second highlighted how the 
energy sector should be a leader in the production of economic infrastructure and inequality reduction. Thus, 
the REIPPPP embodies a twofold objective: it aims at developing RE while contributing to the delivery of jobs for 
the black community and promoting upliftment and broadening economic ownership.  
The program has known six auction rounds as of 2020. Practically, it is an auction process in which 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) compete with projects. They are, then, graded and awarded by the 
Department of Energy based on the quality of their Economic Development (ED) plans (e.g. their contribution to 
job creation, the level of supply of materials from local enterprises etc.) and the estimated cost of generated 
power. In this model, cost weights for 70% of the attributed grade, while the ED considerations weight for 30%. 
Despite this numerical unbalance, the ED plans appear to be the determining and crucial factors. Indeed, the 
market for RE cannot compete solely on cost. All IPPs offer similar electricity costs. Thus, projects can only 
differentiate themselves in the eyes of the Department with ambitious ED strategies. 
Yet, in practice, to what extent does this involvement in local economic development benefit local host 
communities and enable to shape community responses? 
 
1 In the South African context, “black” refers to previously disadvantaged people, i.e. Black African, Colored and Asian 
individuals. To attempt at offsetting the legacy of inequality in the country, companies are legally urged to engage with 
positive discrimination policies and thoroughly document the outcomes of their actions. 
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3.2. / The EPC Company: characteristics, ED and community engagement 
 
This question was explored by investigating an EPC company and its corporate management regarding 
the host communities of two solar projects.  
The firm is a South African subsidiary of a European group. The branch constituted a project development, 
EPC and O&M (Operations and Maintenance) company focused on solar PV (utility-scale and commercial) and 
onshore wind energy. Its strategy was to represent a one-stop-shop for clients willing to develop REI projects, by 
offering a comprehensive range of services to implement these. Yet another particularity of the structure was 
that it did not own or manage any project. Instead, it worked on developing and delivering them, finding 
investors, and selling the projects before their construction. 
 
 In the context of the REIPPPP, the company had an ED department. Practically in this EPC company, ED 
was divided into two sub-departments: 
• ED as considered in the REIPPP program which is about compiling and monitoring substantiating 
documentation and monthly reporting after that the strategy regarding ED has been drafted and 
approved for an awarded project, 
• IR (Industrial Relations) considered as community engagement activities which are about maintaining a 
positive communication between the local stakeholders and the company with the help of Community 
Liaison Officers (CLOs) and other field managers such as the IR Manager. 
These two field employees of the EPC company are crucial for generating a SLO. The CLO is mainly responsible 
for maintaining a positive relationship between the community, the project, and the company, overseeing the 
recruitment process, and assisting with community meetings. For legitimacy matters, the CLO must be hired from 
the host community. Ideally, one should be appointed for each project. However, as it will be explained, the 
company had a failed experience at Bokamoso Solar Park which forced the company to finish construction 
without one. In the meantime, the IR manager is responsible for maintaining a positive relationship between the 
subcontractors, local workers and the EPC company and mitigating site events such as disciplinaries, strikes, 
workplace meetings and so on. Their role is focused on work dynamics.  
 
3.3 / The projects: Bokamoso and Waterloo solar parks 
 
At the time of the study, the EPC company oversaw three projects under construction in the North West 
Province of South Africa. Two of these were selected as case study examples for this research project because of 
their similar technical characteristics and timeline. The chosen projects were Bokamoso Solar Park at 
Leeudoringstad and Waterloo Solar Park at Vryburg. 
 
The two projects use a solar PV technology and present a production capacity of 75 MW. They are located 
on private-owned farms in the North West province (see figure 2). 
For both projects, the studied EPC company got appointed as the EPC and O&M contractor in August 2018, 
for five years. They constitute third-party EPC projects as the EPC company only entered the projects after the 
development phase which was conducted by another firm. For both projects again, original environmental 
impact reports were completed in 2014 when financial close only occurred in July 2018. 
 
According to the firm, the Bokamaso project was confronted to difficulties related to communication 
between the community and the company, whereas the Waterloo project represented a successful execution, 
where all players came together.  
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Figure 2. Locations of the two projects in the North West Province 
Retrieved from Google Maps. 
 
 
 
Both projects are in a region characterized by high unemployment rates, especially among the youth, and by 
competition between local municipalities to attempt at securing jobs for their communities. In the Dr Kenneth 
Kaunda District Municipality, where Bokamoso is set, 29.7% of the overall population and 39.2% of the youth 
(15-34) was unemployed according to the 2011 Census2. Similarly, in the Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati District 
Municipality, where Waterloo is located, 35.8% of the overall population and 46 % of the youth was unemployed3. 
Numbers from the 2016 census are unavailable. These numbers could be higher in 2020, even more as the 
accuracy of South African censuses are contested. 
 
In rural South Africa, administrative division goes as follows: Provinces are divided into districts which are 
divided into local municipalities. These municipalities then include small locations, towns, or cities. 
Bokamoso Solar Park is located in the district of the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality and in the 
municipality of the City of Matlosana. However, the closest town to the project is Leeudoringstad which is in the 
municipality of Maquassi Hills Local Municipalitiy (see figure 3). Because of this geographic proximity, the EPC 
company decided to get involved in the local economic development of Leeudoringstad first. It created major 
tensions as the company eventually had to deal with two different host communities.  
 
2 See Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality’s demographics at https://municipalities.co.za/demographic/140/dr-
kenneth-kaunda-district-municipality 
3 See Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati District Municipality’s demographics at 
https://municipalities.co.za/demographic/141/dr-ruth-segomotsi-mompati-district-municipality 
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 In the meantime, Waterloo Solar Park is located in the district of Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati District 
Municipality, and more precisely in the local municipality of Naledi Local Municipality and in the city of Vyrburg.  
 
Figure 3. Location of Bokamoso solar park in the Dr Kenneth Kaunda District Municipality 
Maps retrieved from municipalities.co.za and Google Maps. 
 
 
 
 
  
Anissa Sidhoum Hassaïne - 17 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 / Methodological approach 
 
Field research was conducted over three months, from January to March 2020, in South Africa. I was 
interning at the studied EPC company over this same period in Cape Town. As part of the ED and IR teams, I 
mainly took up the responsibilities of an ED Administrator. Each administrator oversees the collection and 
monitoring of substantiating documentation for one project. Overall, the ED department ensures that the social 
goals included in the original bid are respected and that subcontractors comply to their contractual reporting 
obligations. The collected documents, thus, serve as proof that local workers are legally employed, that they are 
indeed local, skilled, black, or not etc.   
 Aside from this administrator role, with my research project, I served as an in-house consultant 
investigating the ways the firm approached host communities, from its organizational structure to the field 
practice. I, then, drafted a critical assessment report highlighting operational pitfalls. 
 
 Deriving from this field work experience, this research project was a cross-sectional study. The aim was 
to observe corporate management of host communities and community responses at the specific moment 
during which the study was conducted, that is towards the end of the construction phase for both projects 
undergoing in the first quarter of 2020. 
One field trip to the two sites was undertaken from February 17th to February 22nd. This was enabled by 
the EPC company. More trips were initially considered but personal financial issues made this prospect 
impracticable. Similarly, the covid-19 pandemic precipitated my return to France and limited allocated time for 
conducting interviews. Some of these were still conducted thanks to digital tools. 
 
A comparative case study approach was preferred. The EPC company and its management of two specific 
solar projects in South Africa were used as the study objects. Research on social acceptance and SLO being 
relatively recent, it is essential to provide case studies that enable these concepts to build a practical recognition. 
This generated concrete knowledge is, by definition, context dependent. It enables to provide an in-depth 
understanding of a specific phenomenon, which is highly valuable in the fields of social sciences (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
However, as Stake (2005) states, there can be several pitfalls in this approach, such as the selection of an 
inappropriate case in relation to the theory, a superficial case definition and the lack of rigorous research. To 
mitigate these, extensive research on the theoretical framework and linked themes was conducted, the cases 
were well-defined, and collected data was constantly questioned thanks to member checking mechanisms.    
 
 The project required the collection of primary data with interviews and surveys and the analysis of 
secondary data with the corporate documentation that was made available to me as well as online 
documentation. I aimed at working with mixed methods. Thus, data was both qualitative and quantitative. This 
enabled to provide comprehensive and complementary results. My approach to knowledge was interdisciplinary 
and set between a postpositivist and interpretive perspective.  
 
4.2 / Data collection 
 
 This research project was based on mixed methods to combine numerical analysis with more in-depth 
and descriptive investigation. The involved EPC company as well as members of the local communities were 
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studied through the conducting of semi-structured interviews and the administration of surveys. Additionally, 
throughout the three months, field observation notes were taken. 
 First, quantitative data was collected. To that end, two surveys were drafted and disseminated to all 
employees of the EPC company working in the office in Cape Town and their field managers and employees – as 
well as local workers employed by sub-contractors. The two surveys were differentiated based on local 
belonging: corporate employees were asked about their beliefs on the company’s position towards host 
communities while site workers from these local communities were asked about similar matters but brought to 
an individual level. Most questions applied a Likert scale or a “Yes/no/ I am not sure” dynamic. Several questions 
were left open-ended to give people space to express themselves more accurately. 20 people responded to the 
survey addressed to the EPC company’s employees. 100 people responded to the survey addressed to local site 
workers (48 for Bokamoso, 52 for Waterloo). Practically, the first survey was disseminated via an online platform. 
The second survey was conducted thanks to six survey sessions organized on site and co-animated by the IR 
manager and/or CLO (who mostly helped with translations and explications for some of the respondents). 
This step was useful to measure and identify trends and patterns in the way people consider host 
communities, their responses, the ED strategy of the company they worked for and its impact. These trends, 
then, served as hypothesis to be verified, for the following interviews, as a form of member checking or 
participant validation (Seale, 1999). It served as a conversation starter and it gave participants the opportunity 
to engage with and react to the collected data (Birt et al., 2016). This step helped in guaranteeing the credibility 
and the quality of the results of the research project. 
Qualitative data was only collected after the quantitative aspect of the research was undertaken. Six 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with the key staff members of the company involved in the 
application of the ED strategy (Managing Director, ED manager, supply chain manager, project managers, CLO, 
IR manager). Inputs from site workers and other community members were collected through the survey 
sessions and informal discussions. 
Finally, throughout my stay in South Africa, I kept a journal with field observation notes concerning the 
dynamics of life at the EPC company and on site. Direct observation is an important means of capturing the 
essence of a specific case study setting. Participant and structured observation was undertaken. Despite this 
method of data collection being often overlooked, it enables to finely appreciate the complexity of a social 
phenomenon (Martineau, 2005). 
 
4.3 / Data treatment and analysis 
 
To explore the quantitative data, I conducted basic descriptive analysis and attempted at conducting 
bivariable analysis on selected questions to check if some demographic demographics had an impact on the way 
people responded. All was done on Excel after I cleaned and coded the dataset.  
For the qualitative data collected through semi-structured interviews, discussions and fields notes, 
content and thematic analysis was conducted (Vaismoradi, 2013). I followed the six steps advised by Braun and 
Clarke (2006). I screened verbatims and notes and let emerge recurrent themes. I tried to look both into the 
explicit and implicit meaning as I could refer to recordings to check speech patterns. 
 
4.4 / Ethical Considerations 
 
 To positively add on the existent literature on social acceptance and the SLO in the RE industry and to 
guarantee the quality of this research project, the focus was put on one major gap of the research in this field: 
the corporate side.  
 Even though this research project was enabled by a project development company in which I did an 
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internship, I remained as objective as possible and critical in my assessments of their strategy and practices. 
Indeed, I actively compared their official stand by studying the way they advertised their ED strategy, with the 
actual actions taken and the host communities’ responses to this very process. 
 As a researcher, I sought informed and prior consent from all informants before interviewing, recording, 
or observing them. Throughout the research process, only necessary personal information related to the sample 
characteristics was collected (gender, race, age, occupation). Anonymity was ensured. To protect the EPC 
employees’ anonymity, their position will not be disclosed in this thesis. As for local site workers, it was made 
clear that participation in the survey would not harm their job position.  
Furthermore, if the findings of the study will be made available to the company after the submission of 
the final thesis, the dataset will be kept confidential and will not be transferred. Generated knowledge will be 
used by the EPC company to improve its social impact. 
 
4.5 / Researcher positionality  
 
 In a predominately white academic environment at Leiden, I felt legitimate to pursue research in Africa 
as a North African descendent. In the meantime, I admit having underestimated my position as a young white-
passing woman. In South Africa, I was recognized as a foreigner by people I interacted with. It did not seem to 
impede my research while I was in Cape Town, a city that is cosmopolitan. The company also engaged in an open 
discussion with my research project and accepted to integrate me in their processes. However, I particularly felt 
like an outsider on the two sites in the North West province. The site environments and my research respondents 
were predominately composed of black African males. I managed to make clear that I did not represent the 
company and that the project aimed at improving the relationships between stakeholders in REI projects that 
are proliferating in the region. Consequently, I was faced with two widely different postures: defiance and high 
expectations. People would either shy away or confide in me and expect me to help them improve the situation 
on site on a level that I could not meet. I believe my specific researcher position limited the amount of data I 
ended up collecting but positively impacted its quality. I also engaged in several discussions with the ED Manager 
to make sure the insights I gathered are and will be utilized to improve corporate management of host 
communities in the near future. 
 
Additionally, I conducted a thorough reflection process after coming back from the field following 
Bolton’s (2018) insights. It brought me to a conscious evaluation of my personal why, of my rationale for going 
into this project. I came to acknowledge that there is something inherently political and biased in my research 
project, in the sense that I am actively engaged for an ecological transition and for making the voices of 
marginalized people heard. That is why this research project participates in advocating for the development of a 
just energy transition. 
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5. FINDINGS 
 
The research project attempted at investigating how involved companies in third-party EPC projects 
manage host communities they interact with and their responses, in order to successfully deliver renewable 
energy infrastructure projects in South Africa. It focused on the corporate lenses but made local stakeholders’ 
insights intervene to assess how corporate actions were indeed lived and perceived by their recipients, the host 
communities. These community observations were also utilized to explore key success factors and pitfalls 
regarding community engagement and the corporate ability to achieve a strong and stable SLO. Eventually, all 
identified elements were balanced with an exploration into what can truly be controlled and overcome by 
corporate proponents.    
 
 
5.1 / An assessment of the community responses 
 
 It is essential to understand how the two host communities’ groups received the two projects. It is about 
reporting on the community responses that were observed, towards the end of the construction phase. Three 
key elements were identified as factors critically contributing to the community responses: the individual 
appreciation of project-induced disruptions, the appreciation of communication between the EPC company and 
the host communities and the motives for community-led disruptions. Consequently, an evaluation of these 
responses based on the SLO continuum is attempted.  
 
5.1.1 / Appreciation of project-induced disruptions in the host communities 
 
 Project-induced disruptions are externalities directly generated from the implementation of the projects 
and its operations in the surroundings. They can be positive or negative. In the studied projects, only elements 
concerning individual empowerment and social tensions were indicated by community members.      
 Workers at both sites explained that the construction of the parks significantly and positively changed 
their lives, their daily routines, and the ones of their closed ones. Indeed, workers expressed considerations 
about their newly earned financial capacity, their gained experience, skills that they will be able to utilize in the 
long term, and the importance of learning as a few workers noted that their job constituted a “learning curve”. 
Some even added reflections on newly gained pride and improved self-esteem and mental health as one worker 
highlighted: “my mind gets bright every day when I come to work”. At Bokamoso, special attention was given to 
community impacts regarding the decrease of unemployment. At Waterloo, community considerations were 
more approached through individual lenses: it was about a feeling of participation, of personally doing something 
for the community.  
 However, at Bokamoso, the arrival of the project awakened tensions in the local communities. The failed 
recruitment process led to increase the feeling of injustice and to create an environment keen to jealousy among 
community members. People who did not get a job on site would not only despise the EPC company and its 
subcontractors but also other people who got employed on the project. A 28-year-old team leader explained:  
And there’s anger amongst the community currently. Because, people who were not recruited, they 
ask people who were elected to work here, and tell them why I don’t work. So basically it created a 
lot of anger between us the employees and those who wanted to come and work here. So there’s 
divisions amongst the community. People who see us in the transport and people who are left with 
nothing. So instead of there’s being some good, it brought lots of tensions between the community. 
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5.1.2 / Appreciation of communication enabled by the EPC company 
 
On the two projects, local workers conveyed contentment regarding the level of communication they 
experienced with the EPC company, even though communication flows seemed to be indirect. At Bokamoso, 
84% of the respondents expressed a straightforward positive attitude. They also highlighted that they 
communicated with their employers, the subcontractors, first. At Waterloo, 33% of local workers respondents 
admitted not knowing anyone personally from the EPC company.  
This figure is particularly striking as Waterloo was the only project with a CLO on duty during the whole 
construction phase, in addition to the IR manager that was also deployed on Bokamoso and a third project. It 
simply appears that the EPC company got involved and generated more communication flows mostly when 
things went wrong. As Bokamoso experienced more disruptions, local workers on this site came to be better 
aware as to who represents the EPC company.  
 
However, the content of the interactions, the quality of the communication, was characterized as 
deficient, especially at Bokamoso. Information appeared as superficial and inconsistent between different actors 
(the EPC company and its subcontractors). At the latter site, community members did not grasp the actual 
benefits of the project. When Waterloo community members stated that they were benefiting from the project 
through their jobs, business opportunities and earned financial independence, Bokamoso community members 
came with an expectation posture on basic social services such as education. In addition, on both sites, there was 
a high curiosity and demand from community members to know more about the projects. 79% of local workers 
respondents at Bokamoso reported having faced questions on the project by their community. They were 88% 
at Waterloo (see Appendix B, figure B1). If at Bokamoso most of these questions concerned the when of social 
benefits and new recruitment opportunities, at Waterloo they focused more on the future of the project itself, 
its technicalities and whether it would have broader social impacts (see Appendix B, figure B2). 
Besides, workers at Waterloo were keener to express instances of disrespectful communication. When 
a local worker there stated, “I feel like they don’t take us seriously”, workers at Bokamoso would often join the 
following statement “they always take employees’ problems very serious”. This divergence enables to confirm 
that the EPC company may have been more present when the situation was not optimal.      
 
5.1.3 / Rationales for community-led disruptions 
 
 At both sites, strikes and other community-led disruptions were recurrent during the construction phase. 
However, the discontent groups and scope of revendications widely differed.  
 At Bokamoso, discontent groups included workers and the wider communities. Community members 
from the City of Matlosana Local District often completely blocked access to the site. They revendicated the 
unfairness of the recruitment process which, to them, left them out of the picture, and advocated for their high 
expectations on local socio-economic benefits.  
 At Waterloo, discontent groups only included local workers hired by specific subcontractors. They would 
stop working and organize sit-in on site. Their discontentment was mostly triggered by mistreatments rooted in 
the racial divide observed on site in subcontractors’ managing bodies, unrespect of health and safety measures 
and the short-term nature of contracts. All these motives reveal a profound miscommunication between the 
company and its workers. 
 
 There appears to be a scale for revendications. At Waterloo, the main issue highlighted by workers was 
the disrespectful treatment they experienced when faced by a predominately white managing body. At 
Bokamoso, even though the issue of a racial divide between workforce and management could indeed be 
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observed, workers did not directly express it when asked to talk about what bothered them. They promptly 
tackled bigger issues, that workers at Waterloo did not even think about. Here, it seems like there is a scale for 
pressing matters. When things are generally undergoing with major difficulties, more urgent revendications are 
prioritized.  
 
5.1.4 / Level of social license to operate 
 
 Levels of satisfaction with the projects hinted by local workers are relatively similar. When asked to rank 
their level of satisfaction from one to five, 90% of respondents at Bokamoso answered with a minimum of three. 
This level went up to 98% at Waterloo.  
 Additionally, this response was more dynamic at Bokamoso, where 65% of respondents admitted having 
changed their minds throughout the construction phase. This level dropped to 37% at Waterloo. The difference 
in dynamics might find its origin in a better initial approach at Waterloo, where a better satisfaction seemed to 
be anchored from the very beginning of the project.  
 These responses are to be balanced with inputs from the wider community and physical actions 
undertaken by community members. Thus, Bokamoso can be seen as a case of acceptance when Waterloo would 
be a case of approval. 
Indeed, at the two projects, community responses are relatively positive. No SLO was completely 
achieved. Even though stakeholders accepted the project in their environments, they still expressed 
discontentment towards the corporate management and materialized these disagreements in disruptions 
unfolding at both sites (see Appendices C and D). 
 
 
5.2 / Corporate perception of host communities and their responses 
 
 The level of SLO identified above as well as the factors contributing to its formulation are to be 
challenged by the internal corporate considerations regarding the communities and their responses. It is about 
confronting whether what has been observed on the field matches with the corporate understanding of the 
situation and touching on the way communities are considered in the wide range of core business activities the 
company ought to pursue.  
 
5.2.1 / Corporate perception of project-induced disruptions 
 
 Most of the EPC employees appeared insensitive to the negative disruptions brought by the projects into 
the host communities. These externalities came to be undermined in the face of the perceived weight of benefits, 
including employment and experience in the solar industry. When asked to rank the ability of a project to disrupt 
host communities from one to five, 73% of respondents answered with three or less. They argued that the 
remote nature of the project prevents it from having dreadful impacts, that disruptions are often initiated by 
local leaders instead or that project-induced disruptions can only be positive.  
  Even though the benefits outweigh the negative externalities usually in the eyes of community 
members as well, workers suggested that the company should be in a better empathic posture that questions 
the ability of the project to disrupt social organization locally. An employee answered that “these projects should 
not be thought as disrupting communities”. However, the reality around the Bokamoso site makes it a 
responsibility of the company to be aware of the negative impacts in can force upon host communities. These 
can include inequalities aggravation, miscommunication, and division, feeling of threatened livelihood. They 
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influence community responses but are certainly difficult for corporate proponents to mitigate in complex local 
environments. 
 
5.2.2 / Corporate perception of the obtained SLO level 
 
 A slight disconnection between the observed level of SLO and the perceived level by the EPC company’s 
employees can be noticed. Employees particularly expressed an exacerbated negative response at Bokamoso, 
being influenced by the recurrent community-led disruptions.  
 In line with this very statement, if most employees seem relatively knowledge-poor in terms of the 
specificities of local host communities, they are often made rapidly aware of issues unfolding at the sites. Words 
on local strikes circulate rapidly in the company in both formal and informal settings. Involuntarily, 
communication flows in the EPC company derives from a negative approach to community considerations. 
 Similarly, the EPC employees tended to misjudge the local expectations regarding communication and 
information flows. The CLO and ED manager collectively stated that communities did not care about the 
technicalities of the project and that they were mainly willing to know about recruitment and business 
opportunities. One stated: “The only questions that I get are about jobs. […] It is not about what is the 
development, when is the closure, no. People are generally not interested in that, or the evolution of the project 
itself. They are just interested in are there jobs coming up? Are there you know business opportunities coming 
up?” 
In the meantime, the quantitative survey as well as qualitative interactions showed that there is a high 
curiosity among community members as to the solar plant itself (see Appendix B). Indeed, the industry is fairly 
recent in the North West province and people are not familiar with its stakes as this following statement sums 
up: “they ask a lot about the solar plant, they have never seen it before and they also want to see how it looks 
like”. 
 
5.2.3 / Corporate perception of the communities amid its operations 
 
 When asked to rank their level of agreement with the following statement from one to five: “Community 
considerations are legitimate/important for a power project”, 70% of respondents answered with a minimum of 
four. Three rationales emerged from this positive appreciation. First, communities were perceived as essential 
economic factors. Their workforce and businesses are non-substitutable inputs. When projects are located in 
very remote areas, it is in the EPC company’s best interest to source human and material resources locally. Then, 
some workers expressed the company’s social responsibility to share benefits with the communities that help in 
making the projects implementation possible. Finally, engaging communities appeared to be crucial to obtaining 
their approval and ease project delivery by preventing disruptions that could damage the projects and company 
both financially and morally. 
 The 30% answering negatively argued in line with an underlying negative perception that has been 
sensed in the company. They demonstrated that the projects positively benefit the communities or that the 
communities are not able or legitimate to understand the implications of the projects, so that the projects should 
not depend on their responses. Indeed, it has been observed that, both in the company and the communities 
alike, narratives presented local workers as lazy and / or entitled. This approach dismissed them and contributed 
to an already initiated climate of defiance.     
 On this point, it is, however, important to note that it is the responsibility of the company to invest in 
making communities able to understand the project, to empower them with information they can grasp.   
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As showed by the percentages here, these perceptions are not shared by the whole company. As it will 
be explained later in this paper, the company becomes knowledge-rich regarding local communities as it 
encounters them. However, only a few staff members detain that knowledge and have the emotional, 
intercultural, and social skills to approach them respectfully. Consequently, it appeared that people considering 
communities negatively and undermining their experiences of the project were employees who did not possess 
much knowledge of the cultures of these communities and may have lower social skills. The following two 
statements are particularly striking as they oppose two profoundly different conception of company / community 
relationships. When an engineering employee advocates the sole core business activity of the company, another 
HR employee states that the approach should be collaborative.  
“I understand the importance of obtaining an SLO - but I still maintain that [the EPC company] should 
dictate the terms/speed/quality of the work delivered, not the local community - we are providing 
them with employment, they can chose to either agree to our terms or seek employment elsewhere.” 
Engineering employee. 
“It may help to have a person of colour address community & economic development issues.  
Furthermore, the [EPC company] representative must not come across as dictatorial in his approach 
with community but must have a collaborative approach.” HR employee. 
 
 
5.3 / Corporate management of host Communities and their responses 
 
 After having analyzed the community responses and their perception and understanding by the EPC 
company, the corporate management of host communities in the two studied cases is explored. This overview 
enables to better grasp how the company dealt with the host communities and mitigated the social acceptance 
risk at both projects. The elements of corporate management presented here were selected because they derive 
from the way communities are considered by the EPC company’s employees. They also constitute factors that, 
ultimately, contributed to the formation of the observed SLO level (see Appendices E and F for summaries).  
 
5.3.1 / An ambitious and reflective ED framework 
 
 The studied EPC company, over all internal departments, positively approached the REIPPP program and 
its ED component. ED matters were rightfully considered as obligations putting pressure on companies as they 
require financial and time investment. But it was strongly acknowledged that, in the specific South African 
context, community benefits justified the effort, enabled to create long-term opportunities, and increased the 
chances to win project bids and to successfully deliver projects.  
 Compared to the norms in the industry, the studied EPC company presented an ambitious ED strategy 
that provided a framework for actions with host communities and that was closely monitored and audited 
throughout the project life cycle. On both projects, hundreds of jobs were created, and the EPC company ensured 
the tracking of skills upliftment. Additionally, the company developed ambitious local content strategies with 
programs specifically targeting women-owned businesses for instance. 
 Besides, most importantly, the studied EPC company grasped the importance of understanding local 
communities and showed a deep ability to reflect upon its own operations and scope of community engagement. 
Only a few months before the conducting of the present research project, another psychology student from the 
University of Cape Town was appointed to study the reasons for community unrest at three sites located in the 
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North West province4. A discussion was internally initiated then and is still ongoing as this very research project 
comes to an end. There is a genuine willingness to improve the activities in the interest of both parties, the 
company and local stakeholders.    
 
5.3.2 / Deficient and limited internal communication flows  
 
 Communication within the ED and IR department and with subcontractors and local stakeholders was 
both efficient and ongoing. In the survey, ED administrators responded that they communicated more than 10 
times with the IR team over the past 30 days. Furthermore, employees in this department also showed great 
interpersonal and social intelligence skills. They interacted effectively with a variety of stakeholders both 
physically and digitally. They succeed at creating and sustaining strong relationships with them.  
However, a recurrent issue pinpointed by the conducted study was a gap in internal communication 
flows between the operation teams and the ED/IR team. Indeed, the latter appeared as a rather isolated entity. 
Figure 3 summarizes communication flows within the company organization. 
 
Figure 4. Communication flows with the ED department 
 
 
 These dynamics can be problematic. ED and IR employees generate knowledge on local communities, 
their cultures, their responses and disseminate this information in the department only. However, these 
 
4 Austin, J. (2020). Investigation into community unrest. This internal study was conducted thanks to interviews, a survey 
only disseminated to a few site workers representatives and a desktop investigation into the demographics and local cultural 
norms of host communities. This study enabled to frame the present research project and to decide of an underestimated 
focus to explore (corporate management).    
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employees are not the only employees to encounter host communities. Operations teams are particularly likely 
to communicate with local stakeholders.  
 This internal gap of communication contributes to justifying the strong distinction between the way 
communities are approached by employees with people skills (ED, IR, HR) and people with technical skills. When 
the CLO and HR employees suggested to better acknowledge local cultures and respect people, a few engineering 
employees expressed more cynical approaches to the matter, focusing on the core business activities of the 
company.  
 
5.3.3 / A bias for a negative approach to communication internally and with communities 
 
 The EPC company approached communication rather negatively at several levels, in the way that 
employees were made aware of the evolutions of the projects and in the way that the company disclosed very 
limited information to the host communities and communicated mostly when there were issues unfolding at the 
sites. 
 
 First, employees of the EPC company seemed to be made aware of issues on site mostly. These were the 
main elements that were communicated in meetings and in informal settings when community engagement 
matters arose in discussions. A respondent to the survey disseminated to EPC company employees stated that 
discussions “reduced drastically in the past few months – due to less strikes / threats at the site.”. Also, an 
interviewed employee explained that when people are aware of what is happening on site, it is “kind of bad 
news”. 
 Then, similarly, the company engaged in communication with local workers and other community 
members especially when the situation was degrading. Indeed, the company tended to invest more time and 
effort to intervene to resolve issues. This dynamic contributes in explaining why Bokamoso local workers had a 
better visibility as to who represented the EPC than at Waterloo. It also explains why employees mostly referred 
to strikes and other disruptions at Bokamoso when asked what they knew of the current situations at the two 
projects. 
 Besides, these limited communication flows and spaces between the company and the community 
results from the defiance expressed by the company towards the disclosing of information to the communities. 
The EPC company workers seemed reluctant to sharing information whereas local community members 
demanded more transparency, consistency between the EPC and its subcontractors and a continuous stream of 
information through regular public meetings for instance. A former local worker at the Bokamoso park 
explicated: “In future I honestly think [the EPC company] should have a team of people who work directly with 
the community people who can call mass meetings regularly someone who can advise, who can relate, a team 
that will teach people about the project someone who can layout a proper plan, someone who has the interest of 
both [the EPC company] and the community at heart.”  
 
 Internally at the company, communication was perceived as risky. Indeed, a precise balance must be 
found between disclosing too much information that would confuse local stakeholders and disclosing not enough 
information which would frustrate the same stakeholders. Yet, the company seemed to have fallen in the trap 
of closing communication streams altogether instead of navigating a balance. It has limited the number of public 
meetings, preventing the creation of spaces of communication and collaboration, and stopping official 
information to go out of the sites (information still spread through local workers). It was also often mentioned 
that having a non-knowledgeable host community was better for the project delivery. This limitation of 
communication and information streams was used as a social acceptance risk mitigation action. 
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5.3.4 / An appropriate tendency to narrowing the definition of “community”  
 
 The EPC company appeared overwhelmed by the concepts of SLO and of “community” when it initiated 
their community engagement operational and strategy questioning and improvement process. If the ED strategy 
was formalized early on and offered a framework for community interactions, community engagement was not 
specifically formalized in a routinized guideline, which explains why actions undertaken differed at both projects. 
This issue is being addressed internally. However, one interesting question it created concerned the notion of 
“community”. It seemed unclear what the word entailed.  
 For the two projects, the corporate approach was to narrow the scope of the local stakeholders and 
“community” to interact with. In the REIPPPP guidelines, communities that are to benefit from ED activities are 
all comprised a 50 kilometers radius. However, the company selected to recruit and, thus, have an impact on the 
municipalities that were geographically the closest to the sites. Similarly, the company tended not to involve 
political leaders and focus its interactions to potential local workers and local workers. Both choices seemed 
appropriate and are justifiable. The EPC company is responsible to make the subcontractors provide transport 
for workers’ daily commute and it makes sense to attempt at reducing the time and distance for this commute. 
Closest municipalities are also to benefit from the project in priority as it may be located on their lands and they 
will live with the impacts of the implementation. The non-involvement of political figures was widely recognized 
as wise to avoid greedy politicians to attempt at capturing excessive value out of the project.   
 Nevertheless, the company overlooked the necessity of community building actions. Indeed, as implied 
in the SLO, a community is nothing more than a network of stakeholders to begin with. It is the responsibility of 
the corporate proponents to create a sense of community belonging around the project to be built.     
 
5.3.5 / The overlooked influence of race on the field 
 
 When visiting the sites, it is particularly easy to notice the racial divide existing between the manual labor 
force which is mainly constituted of Black Africans and some Coloreds and the managing body of subcontractors 
which is widely composed of White South Africans.  
 This issue was not brought up by workers and other community members at Bokamoso, but it was very 
much at the core of discontentment at Waterloo. Indeed, people at this site would often even highlight 
mistreatments and justify them by racialized interactions.  
 In the EPC company, it was mostly Black employees who would be conscious of this issue. An employee 
confided: “I mean, I heard them talking before to the people, and I wasn’t impressed. And you know, the people 
also complain about that. You know ‘we don’t mind working, but if people are going to treat us as if we are still 
in pre-19945, then it is a problem’.” When asked whether this subcontractors’ managing body was aware of these 
dynamics, they replied: “No, they are aware. They know exactly what they are doing. They are very much aware. 
I think it is ingrained, it is the way that they think, that is how black people should be treated. You see it, you 
sense it.” 
 
 
5.4 / Environmental factors of community responses 
 
 The environments the projects are implemented in have significant impacts on the way information gets 
transmitted and integrated by people and, eventually, on community responses. External factors also participate 
 
5 In 1994, the first multiracial general elections occurred in South Africa. It marked the end of Apartheid. 
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in shaping the way corporate proponents of infrastructure projects decide to go about a community engagement 
strategy. They also may force them to change and adapt their actions as they go. 
 
5.4.1 / Local rules of the social game: corruption, strikes and entitlement 
 
 The two studied projects were introduced in municipalities tainted by corruption, both in political 
institutions and informal groups. It led the projects to continuously face attempts of value capturing by third 
parties that had no direct interest in being involved. On informal groups, both projects had to navigate through 
“construction mafias”’ imperatives and invest effort to manage to divert them6. Regarding political corruption, 
the EPC company learned from its mistakes at Bokamoso. The construction of the latter started earlier than 
Waterloo. As political leaders are part of local stakeholders (in all social acceptance theories), the company 
informed them and tried to get their involvement and inputs. Two issues arose from this approach. First, the City 
of Matlosana Local District municipality initially refused to cooperate with the company and its project. They 
refused the recruitment process being launched in their communities. Nevertheless, a few months in the project 
construction, they changed their minds and wanted in. The company found a middle ground and created jobs 
for the community, but apparently not enough which generated community discontentment. Secondly, the 
company hired an initial CLO with a personal political agenda. He used his job as a platform to advertise for 
himself and gain social engagement. To that end, he proceeded to share misleading information regarding the 
benefits of the project in the community, which further exacerbated community-led disruptions as it created 
unmet expectations.  
 At Waterloo, however, the EPC company did not involve political institutions. It informed the 
municipality of its operations but was particularly attentive to community inputs. For instance, when the 
municipality tried to get the company to use their official unemployment databases, the community advised that 
the company should create their own after putting in place a fair and just recruitment process. Indeed, 
community members were reluctant to use a database they believed to be biased. 
 
 Similarly, if corruption is an external factor that the company cannot control but has to be aware of in 
order to offer a fairer model, the company also needs to understand local cultural specificities regarding social 
norms and the way communities interact together and with new entrants or opposing actors. Local cultural 
norms and demographics were not extensively investigated for this research project (because it was previously 
done internally in the EPC company and because it would have required more means) but general trends can be 
pinpointed. Recourse to strike is almost cultural in this way that it is a normalized means of making 
revendications heard7. This gets exacerbated with a widespread perception of an entitlement culture in this 
region of South Africa. Numbers of employees at the EPC, local workers and other community members alike 
expressed that their local citizen counterparts felt entitled to socio-economic benefits, without providing the 
necessary effort. Here the corporate narrative might feed in this attitude as the projects are presented as means 
to directly help the community. The discourse should be clearer, broadened and made part of a wide South 
African benefit.   
 
 
6 “Construction mafias” are organized, disruptive and pressure groups that demand high stakes in infrastructure projects 
across the country, especially since 2016. 
7  See Sibanda, K. (2014). Exploring the incidents of strikes in post-Apartheid South Africa. International Business & 
Economics Research Journal, 13(3):553. 
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5.4.2 / Community dynamics and social tensions 
 
 The dynamics internal to communities are complementary factors that shape the corporate 
management of an energy infrastructure project. Around Bokamoso, the City of Matlosana Local District and the 
Maquissi Hills Local Municipality are opposing municipalities. Inhabitants of the City of Matlosana Local District 
feel superior when the inhabitants of the Maquissi Hills Local Municipality feel inferior to the other municipality. 
This articulation is historically rooted in the prevalent industries in both locations. Matlosana is ruled by mining 
and its inhabitants are, thus, wealthier. Maquassi is mostly inhabited by people working in agriculture, which 
pays lower wages. This opposition exacerbated tensions on site and created jealousy situations among the 
citizens of this geographical region.  
 At Waterloo, the issue was different. The closest inhabitation unit is a city, Vryburg. On top of the 
agitation that normally comes with a city, the municipality was (and is still) going through major troubles 
concerning failed provision of basic social services (water, electricity, education and so forth) as figure 5 
illustrates. Consequently, people seemed more invested in these pressing matters rather than the project. They 
were less emotionally available for the project. The situation is profoundly distinct at Bokamoso where the 
closest units are towns and townships without much activity. People of these locations were, thus, more likely 
to get involved in the life of the project.  
 
 
Figure 5. “We want water” tag in downtown Vryburg 
 
 
5.4.3 / Remote Nature of Projects 
 
 Finally, the remote nature of projects also participates in the formation of community responses, in 
different manners depending on the initial social dynamics that were just described above. Both projects require 
local workers to be transported by appointed buses for their daily commute. This trip requires major organization 
and is not done by anyone, at any given time.  
 At Bokamoso, where the community life is relatively stable, this remote location still awakes the interest 
and curiosity of people. They want to know what is happening. In the meantime, at Waterloo, this remote 
characteristic gets blurred in the climate of social tensions. People tend to forget about the project and do not 
show much interest for it, even more so that they do not feel its presence.  
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
 Finally, it is necessary to evaluate the relevance and efficiency of the theoretical framework used in this 
research project for the specific South African context. If the SLO represents an ambitious ideal for all 
infrastructure projects, its application in the two studied cases appeared hindered by practical problems related 
to the particularities of the third-party EPC project delivery model and the latent lack of trust observed in the 
involved host communities. The highest SLO, thus, seemed to be an unrealistic goal to achieve. 
 
6.1 / The particularities of a third-party EPC project 
 
 It is a given that a high level of SLO implies great financial and time investments. Indeed, it is about 
building a strong relationship based on legitimacy, credibility, and trust. It requires the corporate entity 
attempting at formulating a social license to be extremely aware of the environment it encounters and to engage 
with local stakeholders as early as possible. Ideally, this engagement commences with the development phase. 
Local inhabitants are informed of the possibility of a project in the coming years. It is, nonetheless, extremely 
important here to make them aware of the project and of the possibility of its failure. Companies should not go 
into that development phase promising anything. However, in practice, to gather all permits, leases, contracts 
and social acceptance, developers tend to embellish the scope of socio-economic benefits the project will 
produce for the inhabitants of the local area.   
 In a third-party EPC project, the dynamic switches and gets complexified. A new corporate actor is 
mandated to pursue the construction phase of a project that has been developed by another firm. For local 
inhabitants this change materializes in a change of interlocutor, which can awake confusion. Besides, this 
situation often comes with a modified corporate narrative and discourse. The promises made by the developers 
and other actors are to be confronted, objectively addressed, and fact-checked, which can lead to 
disappointment. 
 The SLO is, thus, particularly difficult to obtain when there is a wider diversity of interlocuters for local 
stakeholders, which increases the risk of inconsistent communication. This risk already exist in other project 
delivery models as a project generally involves a developer, that can stay at the table until exploitation if it can 
carry the activities until then, subcontractors and a project owner. The issue is only exacerbated in third-party 
EPC projects because it adds yet another actor and, because the developer is out of the picture and cannot be 
held accountable anymore.  
   
6.2 / A framework difficultly applicable in an instable socio-political environment 
 
 In the theory, the highest level of SLO, psychological identification, is achievable once local stakeholders 
trust the proponent companies. Some observable elements of such a high-quality level of relationship might be 
the local inhabitants advocating for the project, presenting a united front with the companies and political 
leaders and institutions showing support.  
 However, in the studied cases, it seemed objectively unrealistic to expect the EPC company to manage 
to get to that point. Indeed, it evolved in environments in which communities did not trust their own institutions, 
actors they have known for most of their lives8. During interviews, discussions and survey sessions, participants 
 
8 Distrust and defiance in societal institutions is a widespread issue in South Africa. Most recent data on the matter was 
collected by Edelman in their “2020 Trust Barometer”. It is accessible online at: 
https://www.edelman.com/trustbarometer 
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made clear that they were defiant of their own local government and its ability to improve the social condition. 
At Waterloo, when the company first offered to use the local municipality employment database, it was citizens 
who preferred the company to create its own unbiased database. It, then, appeared difficult for host community 
members to trust a completely new entrants in their environments. At the two projects, during survey sessions 
organized with local workers, respondents laughed when asked about whether they trusted the company and 
many preferred not to answer the question (see Appendix C).   
 Similarly, this highest level of SLO can only be achieved with open and continuous communication. If the 
studied EPC company failed on that aspect at some levels, it went into the projects with ambitious community 
engagement goals to start with. Public meetings were indeed organized. Nevertheless, they quickly became 
platforms for disruptive forces to spread their narratives. Consequently, the EPC company shut down these 
spaces to avoid false information to be leaked to community members. The choice is understandable in such a 
complex socio-political climate. But the company should have resumed these actions when the situation got 
calmer.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This research established that, overall, both studied projects generated two positive community 
responses levels during construction. However, the highest level of SLO was not achieved. Community-led 
disruptions were still occurring, and community members pinpointed deep communication issues with the EPC 
company and/or its subcontractors. 
These results were, then, confronted to the way the EPC company considered the communities and their 
responses internally. It appeared that a skewed, over-optimistic, perception of project externalities was 
normalized in the EPC company’s workforce. Nevertheless, most of the company, and especially employees with 
high interpersonal skills, considered communities as essential factors for the success of projects.   
Additionally, an exploration into the applied strategies and actions undertaken by the company to deal 
with, manage and mitigate the social acceptance risk arising from community responses was deployed. These 
elements of corporate management towards the communities derived from the way the company considered 
the communities and partly justified the observed level of SLO at each project. Especially, it appeared that 
community engagement considerations were framed by an ambitious, accountable, and reflective ED / IR 
strategy and department. However, communication flows in the EPC company and with local communities ought 
to be improved. A negative approach to communication seemed maintained. 
Particular attention was, consequently, given to external factors that impacted community responses 
and the social acceptance risk but that the company might not have been able to control efficiently. Local cultural 
rules of the social game as well as the ongoing socio-political conjunctures influenced the ways people expressed 
satisfaction and discontentment and their emotional availability to be interested in the evolutions of the projects. 
 
This research aimed at contributing to the dearth of knowledge on community responses to REI in the 
global South. It did so by exploring the corporate management of host communities, its success factors, and 
pitfalls, in the context of two third-party EPC projects that were under construction. The assessment of the local 
community responses enabled to dive into the elements of corporate practice that shaped these attitudes and 
to highlight their limitations. This study was profoundly anchored in the practitioner world and ought to be 
utilized to improve corporate strategies towards local stakeholders in developing countries.  
 
 Academia often appears as a closed circle with very few ties to the outside world. It seems disconnected. 
Yet, I strongly believe that academic research should be relevant for practitioners. Expertise on practical issues 
should be fostered and made available for professionals working in NGOs, associations, unions, companies, to 
improve their operations.   
Businesses are in permanent contact with marginalized populations. They are stakeholders, be they 
employees, clients, prospects, externalities recipients and so on. However, business units might not have the 
expertise to interact with them in efficient ways. It is understandable as it is not part of their core business. Here, 
academia has a key role to play. Social sciences and humanities detain skills, competencies, knowledge to 
efficiently guide corporate actors to have a real positive social impact.  
Therefore, I am ending this thesis with actionable recommendations I have identified throughout my 
research project on the field and afterwards regarding community engagement in REI projects in South Africa. 
They are addressed to corporate proponents but could be considered by South African policy makers as the 
REIPPP is a program that should also be improved. 
 
As it was touched on, ideally, the project development firm should stay at the table until project 
delivery. It is in the best interest of the corporate proponents which want the project to be successful and of 
host communities which want to benefit from the project and not be negatively disrupted by its activities. It 
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enables the corporate interlocuter for communities to remain the same which eases communication and can 
prevent community discontentment.  
However, it is acknowledged that this very scenario might not always be possible to stick to. Indeed, in 
the studied cases, the project developer went bankrupt. Consequently, another company had to be appointed 
to deliver the projects. 
 
These following recommendations mostly concern third-party EPC projects and focus on the 
construction phase. They consist of good practice elements. They all answer specific issues and needs identified 
in the studied cases. Overall, they are believed to improve the understanding of local “rules of the game”, to 
enable a better consideration of host communities and, ultimately, ease project delivery by mitigating social 
acceptance risks that can be dreadful during construction.  
Some of these were already partly put in place by the studied EPC company (or were actively considered). 
They are just mentioned here as they should be extended to the whole industry. 
They target three aspects of project implementation: the pre-construction phase that should be a 
dedicated time to understand the local social reality, the project procurement and subcontracting process that 
should be particularly sensitive to what the local environment has to offer, and the core of the community 
engagement strategy that should make more place for community members to actively participate. 
 
 
7.1 / PRE-CONSTRUCTION: Understanding the local reality 
 
7.1.1 / Conduct a secondary community analysis led by anthropologists 
 
The first community analysis is conducted during the development phase, years before the start of 
construction, and by the project development company. In this timespan, the social dynamics can change widely. 
Because the analysis is undertaken by another actor, there is a need for the EPC company to reclaim that 
knowledge and create a relationship with the community. 
The proposed solution is to conduct a secondary community analysis closer to the construction phase 
that would offer an in-depth understanding of the local cultures, with the help of trained anthropologists. 
 
This secondary community analysis should be conducted by the project owner (as they are the actor that 
will be overseeing the project in the long term) but with the assistance of the EPC company and its CLO (so that 
the latter can grasp the generated knowledge to ease project delivery through the construction phase). 
The analysis should start right after the development phase, when the development risk is completely 
lifted (that is to say, when the project carriers are certain that the project will indeed be delivered because they 
have the permits, technical evaluations are positive etc.). It cannot be conducted before as, in the case that the 
project fails, the second analysis would have created expectations that cannot be met and that are dreadful for 
the communities (which could be reluctant to new projects coming in their environments afterwards). 
The analysis should focus on the closest communities to the project (and not all communities included 
in the 50km radius advised by the REIPPPP). 
This “analysis” should also mark the start of an active dialogue and consultation process. It is not only 
about the company gathering information but also about future host communities sharing their thoughts and 
the company disclosing information as well.  
If the analysis is outsourced (as it is often the case), the appointed company should be contractually obligated 
to involve anthropology experts from the closest university to the project site and the CLO (which is to be 
employed early on then). 
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7.1.2 / Organize intercultural workshops and trainings 
 
Throughout its involvement, the EPC company becomes knowledge-rich when it comes to understanding 
local communities because it directly interacts with them (for recruitment, public meetings, individual 
solicitations etc.). However, the created knowledge is concentrated in a few staff members, most often the ones 
in charge of ED obligations and IR / Community Engagement matters. These employees also show great 
communication skills. Yet, these same employees are isolated in the company and are not the only ones dealing 
with the communities.  
Additionally, on the field, miscommunication between corporate representatives and host communities’ 
members is recurrent. It creates discontentment, false expectations and may lead host communities’ members 
to feel mistreated. 
The proposed solution is to organize regular intercultural workshop sessions with all the employees who are 
to encounter host communities of projects and with managers of subcontracted firms, to train them as to how 
to interact in specific intercultural settings. 
 
The secondary community analysis should provide a report and an intercultural brief that could be used 
during trainings. The appointed community analysis company should be contractually obligated to provide these 
two deliverables.  
The content of training sessions should, then, be adapted to the specificities of each project and its host 
communities. One “one-size-fits-all” training cannot be conducted. But it is in the company’s best interest to 
have an outline template ready with some general advice on intercultural communication and the South African 
heritage of interracial relationships.  
Trainings should be organized and animated by ED / IR staff members who have or are currently working on 
the project to be analyzed.  
Trainings should be addressed to all employees planning to visit the sites punctually or to work there 
temporarily and to managers of subcontracted firms, even though they are said to be “local”, at all hierarchical 
levels.  
The purpose of such training sessions should be to provide people who are to encounter host communities’ 
members with the knowledge of the local socio-economic reality and cultural norms, communication skills and 
tools to communicate respectfully and a reminder of the scope of benefits the project is to bring (so that all 
corporate proponents can present a united front on this point which will help with expectations management). 
 
 
7.2 / PROJECT PROCUREMENT AND SUBCONTRACTING: Seizing the concept of “local” 
 
7.2.1 / Make local content strategies more local and socially just 
 
Local content procurement is an ED obligation of the South African REIPPP program. It is about sourcing 
materials and services locally to produce the project. However, “local” here only means South African. It pushes 
project constructors towards several diverting practices. Often not from the close project environment, they call 
on subcontractors that are headquartered in major cities, far away from the project sites. They also end up 
working with the same list of companies on different projects. Some of these practices are understandable but 
arguable. Indeed, it is easier to build a trustful relationship with companies that work together regularly. It 
enables the constructor to know how to manage its subcontractors efficiently. Additionally, it can be tricky to 
find true “local” companies able to deliver the required services when the renewable energy industry is not fully 
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structured in some rural areas. But constructors can and should try to include more local companies to structure 
this industry. 
The proposed solution is to redefine “local” as in province local or, better, community local and launch 
ambitious strategies targeting local businesses, particularly owned by marginalized unprivileged populations. 
 
This recommendation requires companies to stand as pioneers in their approach as it is not actively 
encouraged by the policy. A dedicated supply chain manager should be hired and work towards the drafting of 
these ambitious strategies for each project. 
These strategies should be based on community analyses and the identified skillsets in host communities. 
The skillsets should be exploited first. 
When the local skillsets and competencies are not sufficient and when the projects are located in remote 
sites, the constructor could source services and materials in the closest big city or the province capital. 
The strategies should particularly look at marginalized populations: the South African historically 
marginalized and/or women.  
 
7.2.2 / Introduce racial and ethnic representation in the managing body on the field 
 
A significant part of workers discontentment is rooted in subcontractors’ managing bodies appearing at 
disrespectful, non-understanding and racially unsensitive. There is an observable racial divide between managing 
bodies and the labor force on the field. Power relations are racialized. Managers are often white male when local 
workers are mostly black. In a country that is scared by the legacy of the Apartheid, there is a profound need to 
tackle these dynamics. They consist a brake to the economic development of historically marginalized people 
and lead to disruptions in the project delivery process. 
In addition to the intercultural trainings, the proposed solution is to oblige subcontractors to employ part of 
their managing body locally (in the host communities or the closest bigger cities), in a way that it enables racial 
representativity.   
 
The constructing company should contractually oblige subcontractors to hire a certain percentage of its 
operational managing body locally. The chosen percentage should reflect the local demographics but be 
balanced with the available skillset locally. 
This strategy should be drafted in collaboration between the supply chain, the ED, and IR / Community 
Engagement managers.  
The constructing company should oversee the recruitment process and, thus, invest in HR capabilities.  
 
 
7.3 / COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT: Communicating controlled information 
 
7.3.1 / Make local workers spokespeople for the project and the company 
 
There can be a deep lack of knowledge concerning the projects in the communities about the project but 
also a great level of curiosity (mostly about benefits in terms of employment, local businesses opportunities and 
social projects). Community-led disruptions are rooted in this lack of knowledge. Community members have high 
expectations that are not challenged and fact-checked by the companies: they expect contracts to be 
reconducted, they expect large social projects to be undertaken etc. Rumors also form easily in this context. 
Companies have trouble to manage communication flows and to let go of some information. To protect their 
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operations and avoid being misunderstood, they often end up in the pitfalls of not disclosing enough information 
and closing all possible communication streams (by not organizing public meetings for instance).  
The proposed solution is to invest in education and training for local workers regarding information on the 
project and its benefits for the community. They know the community, they should know about the company 
and the project, to spread true, verifiable, and accessible information in their circles. 
 
Training sessions should occur regularly, in the meantime as public meetings. Trainings should be a space for 
dialogue. It is about the company disclosing elements of language and information that the workers should 
disseminated around them but also about gathering insights and early complaints if any.  
 
 
These five recommendations were selected for their innovativeness in the industry because they consist 
of profound changes. However, additionally to these, good practice specific to the South African context includes 
appointing well-trained and local CLOs for each project, informing but not involving local political actors to 
prevent inappropriate attempts to capture value, not engaging with construction mafias, fostering constant 
dialogue between the parties (and creating spaces that allow for such communication), engaging with the 
geographically closest communities (instead of the advised 50km radius), engaging in community building 
activities (and understanding that the concept of community is evolutive and has to be actively constructed by 
involved companies), organize fair recruitment processes etc.  
  As hinted in the introduction of this section, it would also be crucial that the policy gets improved to 
uniformize the practice over the industry. 
 
Finally, further interdisciplinary research on topics related to community engagement and social 
acceptance risks in REI projects should continue to be conducted in non-Western countries, where the stakes are 
profoundly different than what is known in the West. In South Africa especially, attention should be given to 
expectations management and the lack of trust in institutions that seems to impact the way communities react 
to new corporate entrants in their environment. Long-term studies over the whole life cycle of projects (from 
ideation to commissioning or even dismantlement) could be particularly interesting as they would significantly 
add to the available knowledge on the topics.  
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APPENDIX A. 
Simplified renewable energy infrastructure project model 
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APPENDIX B. 
Community curiosity at Bokamoso and Waterloo solar parks 
 
Participants to the site workers survey were asked whether they were faced with questions regarding updates 
on the projects by members of their communities. Figure B1 illustrates the levels of community curiosity 
observed at both sites. Table B1 summarizes the recurrent topics of questions respondents were faced with. 
 
Figure B1. Community curiosity levels at both sites 
 
 
Table B1. Topics of questions received by site workers 
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APPENDIX C. 
SLO levels at Bokamoso and Waterloo solar parks 
 
 
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX D. 
Quantitative data extract on statements testing with site workers 
 
Participants to the local workers survey were asked to rate their level of agreement with 16 statements. The following statements were selected to be 
disclosed here as they enable to assess the accuracy of each level of SLO at the two projects. However, the observed data must be balanced with inputs 
from community members who are not site workers. These numbers do not suffice to assess the SLO level surrounding each site.  
Data is disclosed in percentages of respondents (n for Borkamoso = 48, n for Waterloo = 52). 
 
   
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Prefer not 
to say 
Total 
ACCEPTANCE 
“The company provides true, accessible, 
and understandable information.” 
                  
Bokamoso 8,3 12,5 8,4 20,8 33,3 8,3 8,3 100 
Waterloo 1,9 15,1 7,6 5,7 35,9 26,4 7,5 100 
 
          
“I have accepted the company's presence 
and its activities in the area.” 
                  
Bokamoso 2,1 8,5 4,3 10,6 61,7 12,8 0,0 100 
Waterloo 1,9 0,0 0,0 1,9 54,7 41,5 0,0 100 
  
         
APPROVAL 
“I feel proud of the project being in my 
locality.”  
                  
Bokamoso 4,4 0,0 4,4 6,5 41,3 43,5 0,0 100 
Waterloo 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 41,2 54,9 2,0 100 
 
          
“I would support the company and the 
project if I were asked to.“ 
                  
Bokamoso 2,2 2,2 4,4 6,5 43,5 34,8 6,5 100 
Waterloo 0,0 0,0 1,9 0,0 37,7 56,6 3,8 100 
  
         
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
IDENTIFICATION 
“I feel like the project is completely part of 
the environment and the community.” 
                  
Bokamoso 4,2 4,2 4,2 18,8 45,8 22,9 0,0 100 
Waterloo 0,0 0,0 7,4 3,7 33,3 51,9 3,7 100 
 
          
“I trust the company.” 
                  
Bokamoso 8,7 2,2 4,4 13,0 37,0 21,7 13,0 100 
Waterloo 1,9 0,0 0,0 5,6 50,0 22,2 20,4 100 
  
APPENDIX E. 
Overview of corporate management key success factors 
 
Key success factors are elements that positively influenced the observed levels of SLO. 
 
 
Themes BOTH PROJECTS BOKAMOSO WATERLOO 
Operational 
Processes 
Reflective ED/IR departments  
 
Extensive communication flows 
internal to the ED/IR 
departments (what is observed 
on the field can be reported to 
the hierarchy easily) 
  
HR Capabilities High internal interpersonal skills 
in the ED/IR and HR departments 
 
Responsive and polyvalent IR 
Manager 
 Trustworthy Community 
Liaison Officer (CLO) 
recognized in the 
community as such 
 
Fair recruitment of local 
workers 
Community 
Definition 
  Limited political 
engagement 
Communication 
with 
communities 
  Early and continuous 
communication (the CLO 
was involved with the 
project development firm 
and ensured continuity 
and consistency) 
Subcontractors 
Management 
Clarification of EPC expectation in 
a contractually binding document 
(the Site Level Agreement) 
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APPENDIX F. 
Overview of corporate management pitfalls 
 
Pitfalls are elements that negatively influenced the observed levels of SLO. 
 
 
Theme BOTH PROJECTS BOKAMOSO WATERLOO 
Operational 
Processes 
Isolated ED/IR departments 
(lack of communication flows 
with operations teams) 
 
Negative approach to 
information sharing (focus on 
issues) 
  
HR Capabilities 
 
 Failed experience with the 
CLO 
 
Community 
Definition 
 Political engagement   
Communication 
with 
communities 
Greater involvement when the 
situation deteriorates  
Lack of consistent 
communication on the 
actual benefits of the 
project (creation of high 
expectations) 
 
Subcontractors 
Management 
Inconsistency of information 
between the EPC and 
subcontractors 
 
Racial misrepresentation and 
disrespectful hierarchical 
relationships 
  
 
